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Look Homeward Candidate: Evaluating and
Reforming Kentucky's Residency Definition and
Bona Fides Challenges in Order to Avoid a Potential
Crisis in Gubernatorial Elections
S. Chad Meredithl
I. INTRODUCTION
M ITT Romney, Mitch Daniels, Bill Richardson, and Haley Barbour all
have at least two things in common-they are the governors of their
respective states, and if their states defined residency in the same way that
Kentucky does, they would not have even been eligible to run for governor
in the first place.' The harsh realities of Kentucky's candidate residency
requirements hit one particular candidate with full force when he was
disqualified from running for lieutenant governor in 2003. Early in 2003,
Hunter Bates, a lifelong Kentuckian and former chief of staff for Senator
Mitch McConnell, was ruled ineligible to run for lieutenant governor be-
cause a state circuit court found that he did not meet the residency require-
ments for that office. His disqualification threatened to cast a gubernato-
rial election into doubt by placing the legal status of a gubernatorial slate
in question. The next year, in a state senate race, Kentucky's anomalous
residency law was coupled with a poorly written statute governing pre-
election candidate qualification challenges, causing what some might call a
constitutional crisis. That particular controversy pitted the judiciary against
the legislature and left a state senate district without representation in the
general assembly for over a year.
Kentucky emerged from these two controversies with a dubious defini-
tion of residency and an incompletely resolved dispute over which branch
of government possesses the authority to decide pre-election qualifications
challenges. With that being the state of the law, the commonwealth faces
i B.A. 2004, Washington and Lee University; J.D. expected 2007, University of Kentucky
College of Law. The author wishes to thank his wife, Rebekah, for her unconditional love and
support, which has been particularly invaluable during the rigors of law school. The author
would also like to thank Rebecca Jennings and the fine legal professionals at Middleton &
Reutlinger for assisting with his research efforts. Without their help, many of the documents
referred to herein would have been exceedingly difficult to obtain. Finally, the author would
like to thank Professor Lori Ringhand for reading an early draft of this article and making
much needed-and much appreciated-suggestions.
2 See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
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the specter of additional, and possibly even more serious, crises in the fu-
ture. A particularly troublesome scenario is one in which the state is left
without a winner in a gubernatorial election and the courts and legislature
are left to battle indefinitely over who has jurisdiction to determine the
outcome of the election.
This Note examines two issues that have been most problematic in
recent years: (1) the rules on residency, and (2) who gets to decide ques-
tions of residency at different points in the electoral process. This Note will
provide an analysis of these problems, explore possible solutions, and make
recommendations as to the most appropriate reforms.
Part II of this Note discusses two recent dilemmas caused by Kentucky
election law: Shain v. Bates and Stephenson v. Woodward. Part III provides
a solution to the residency definition problem by explaining that a pure
domicile test is the appropriate definition. Part III further examines the
way in which the court in Hunter Bates' case interpreted residency and
concludes not only that the court applied the wrong definition, but also that
the case would have turned out differently had the correct definition been
used. Part IV addresses the problems with the current candidate qualifica-
tions challenge statute and asserts that the Kentucky legislature should
rewrite that law using the Mississippi and Indiana statutes as models.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In early 2003, Congressman Ernie Fletcher and his running mate, Hunter
Bates, were leading the pack of Republican candidates in the Kentucky
gubernatorial primary.3 Polling showed that Fletcher had strong statewide
name recognition and support,4 and of the four Republican slates, Fletcher
and Bates had raised, by far, the most money. In fact, the February cam-
paign finance reports revealed that Fletcher and Bates had raised nearly
$800,000, while the next highest amount was approximately $128,000. s
From the moment they filed to run, there was a popular perception that
Fletcher and Bates were the favored candidates of Senator Mitch McCon-
nell, Kentucky's senior senator and undisputed Republican leader.6 The
Fletcher-Bates slate appeared to be well on its way to winning the primary
nomination in a year that was the Kentucky Republican party's best oppor-
tunity in decades to win the offices of governor and lieutenant governor.
3 Al Cross, Bluegrass Poll; Chandler Fletcher Lead Primary Races, COURIER-J. (Louisville),
Feb. i8, 2003, at At [hereinafter Cross, Bluegrass Poll].
4 Id.
5 Kentucky Registry of Election Finance, Online Searchable Database, http://www.
kref.state.ky.us/krefsearch (last updated Mar. 13, 2003) (click on "By Election Date" under
"Candidate Searches," then enter "5/20/2003" as the date).
6 Al Cross, Rep. Fletcher Enters, CouRIER-J. (Louisville), Dec. 3, 2002, at A i.
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But on March 26, a circuit judge in Oldham County threw a wrench in
the works of the high-flying duo by declaring Bates ineligible to run for
lieutenant governor.7 Bates decided to withdraw from the election the fol-
lowing day, stating that he did not want to detract attention from the true
issues of the campaign by appealing the ruling and engaging in a high-pro-
file legal battle.8
The circuit judge's decision was the result of a motion that had been
filed in Oldham Circuit Court on behalf of a University of Louisville stu-
dent and was later joined by Robert Heleringer, a candidate for lieutenant
governor on an opposing slate.9 The motion stemmed from speculation that
Bates did not satisfy the residency requirements for the office of lieutenant
governor.10 More specifically, the motion contended that Bates' candidacy
was a violation of section 72 of the Kentucky Constitution" because he
would not be able to satisfy the requirement of having been a citizen and
resident of Kentucky for the requisite six years immediately preceding the
election."2 The claim was predicated on the fact that Bates lived in North-
ern Virginia from 1995 to 2002 while serving in Washington, D.C. on the
staff of Senator Mitch McConnell. 3 The movants argued that Bates lost
his status as a Kentucky resident during that time period because his actual
abode was in Virginia. Bates, on the other hand, argued that he retained
his status as a Kentucky resident while serving in Washington because he
maintained sufficient ties with the commonwealth. 4 The Oldham Circuit
Court sided with the movants, 5 ruling that residence refers to inhabitance
7 Shain v. Bates, No. o3-CI-oo153, slip op. at 14-18 (Oldham Cir. Ct., Ky. Mar. 26, 2003);
Al Cross, Bates Ruled Ineligible to Run, COURIER-J. (Louisville), Mar. 27, 2003, at Ai [hereinafter
Cross, Bates Ruled Ineligible].
8 Al Cross, Bates Withdraws as Lieutenant Governor Candidate, COURIER-J. (Louisville), Mar.
28, 2003, at Ai.
9 Heleringer, a former state representative, was the running mate of state Rep. Steve
Nunn. Cross, Bluegrass Poll, supra note 3.
1o Al Cross, Suit Claims Bates Ineligible to be Lieutenant Governor, COURIER-J. (Louisville),
Mar. 12, 2003, at B i [hereinafter Cross, Suit Claims Bates Ineligible].
i i Section 72 reads:
The Governor and the Lieutenant Governor shall be at least thirty years
of age, and have been citizens and residents of Kentucky for at least
six years next preceding their election. The duties of the Lieutenant
Governor shall be prescribed by law, and he shall have such other duties
as delegated by the Governor.
Ky. CONST. § 72.
12 Cross, Suit Claims Bates Ineligible, supra note 1o.
13 Id.
14 Respondent's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Relief Under KRS 1 18.176
at 9, Shain v. Bates, No. 03-CI-oo153 (Oldham Cir. Ct., Ky. Mar. 26, 2003).
15 Cross, Bates Ruled Ineligible, supra note 7; Shain v. Bates, No. 03-CI-o0 153, slip op. at
14-18 (Oldham Cir. Ct., Ky. Mar. 26, 2003).
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and the place of actual abode, not the place of domicile. 6 The circuit judge
determined that Bates could not have been a resident of Kentucky for the
six previous years because he had been a physical inhabitant of Virginia for
five of those years. 7
Bates' disqualification put the Fletcher campaign in a state of flux
and led to another lawsuit when a primary opponent attempted to have
Fletcher thrown off the ballot on the grounds that he no longer had a full
slate." Fletcher eventually won the right to choose another running mate
and continue his campaign, 9 but significant damage had already been done
to Kentucky election law. The damage came in the form of an interpreta-
tion of the term "resident" that-as will be discussed subsequently-is
at odds with the traditional definition and also has the undesired effect of
discouraging Kentucky's upcoming leaders from seeking valuable learning
and developmental experiences outside the commonwealth.
A little over a year and a half after Bates was declared ineligible to run
for lieutenant governor, the residency issue surfaced once again in a state
senate race in Louisville. At 4:00 P.M. on the eve of the 2004 general elec-
tion, Virginia Woodward, the Democratic candidate for the thirty-seventh
district state senate seat, filed a motion in Jefferson Circuit Court seeking
to disqualify her opponent, Republican Dana Seum Stephenson. 0 Wood-
ward claimed that Stephenson should be disqualified because she failed
to meet the residency requirement for state senate candidates set forth in
section 32 of the Kentucky Constitution."' Two days later, after the voting
had been completed and Stephenson had received 1,022 votes more than
Woodward, a circuit judge issued a temporary injunction preventing the
Jefferson County Board of Elections from certifying the results pending a
final ruling on Woodward's motion.2 On November 22, the court disquali-
fied Stephenson, finding that she "had failed to meet the six-year residency
requirement found in section 32 of the Kentucky Constitution. '2 3 As it
turned out, Stephenson had physically lived in Indiana during a portion of
the preceding six years while pursuing a graduate degree at Indiana Uni-
versity Southeast. 4 That was the determining factor for the court.2 5
16 Shain, No. 03-CI-0015 3, slip op. at 14-18.
17 Id.
18 Jack Brammer & Ryan Alessi, Nunn Campaign Goes to Court--Seeks to Remove Fletcher
from Primary, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Mar. 29, 2003, at Bi.
i9 Heleringer v. Brown, 104 S.W.3 d 397 (Ky. 2oo3).
2o Stephenson v. Woodward, 182 S.W.3d 162, 164 (Ky. 2005).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 165.
23 Id.





The residency issue quickly turned out to be a mere sideshow to the
much more significant controversy of whether the court actually had au-
thority to disqualify Stephenson. Kentucky Revised Statutes ("KRS") §
118.176 allows circuit courts to hear challenges to a candidate's qualifica-
tions, like residency, so long as the challenge is filed prior to the general
election.16 The state constitution, however, says that the senate has au-
thority to judge contested elections of its members.17 Thus, the question
became whether the Jefferson Circuit Court had authority to determine
the case because the motion was filed before the election, or whether the
senate had that authority because the case had not been adjudicated prior
to the election. Stephenson and Senate President David Williams 8 argued
that the state senate had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute under the
Kentucky Constitution because the dispute was transformed into an elec-
tion contest once the election was held. 9 The court, however, found that
it had jurisdiction under KRS § 118.176 because Woodward's motion had
been filed prior to the general election.30 After finding that it had jurisdic-
tion, the court disqualified Stephenson,31 thereby, arguably, making Wood-
ward the winner by default.
Stephenson filed an election contest in the Kentucky State Senate on
December 7, 2004.32 Woodward was sworn in as a state senator on January
1, 2005, by a state circuit judge, and she took the oath three days later in
the state senate chamber with the rest of the senate.33 Shortly thereafter,
a senate committee was empaneled to look into the election contest.-, Af-
ter a committee investigation and two days of deliberations, Stephenson
was sworn in and seated as the senator from the thirty-seventh district.35
z6 KRS § 118.176(2) states:
The bona fides of any candidate seeking nomination or election in a
primary or general election may be questioned by any qualified voter
entitled to vote for such candidate or by an opposing candidate by
summary proceedings consisting of a motion before the Circuit Court
of the judicial circuit in which the candidate whose bona fides are in
question resides.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118.176(2) (West 2oo6)
27 Ky. CONST. § 38.
28 Senator Williams intervened in his capacity as president of the state senate. Woodward,
No. 04-CI-09261, slip op. at i.
29 Respondents' Brief at 2-4, Woodward v. Stephenson, 04-CI-09261 (Jefferson Cir. Ct.,
Ky. Nov. 11, 2004).
30 Woodward, No. o4-CI-o9261, slip op. at 6-7.
31 Id. at 13-14.
32 Stephenson v. Woodward, 182 S.W.3d 162, 165 (Ky. 2005).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 166.
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Woodward then filed suit in Franklin Circuit Court, and the court enjoined
Stephenson from performing any duties as a state senator.36 By this time,
the judiciary and legislature were on a collision course with a constitutional
crisis clearly in sight. The crisis was finally averted, not because of the
Supreme Court of Kentucky decision on the matter, but by Stephenson's
choice to resign from the senate on January 3, 2006.11
While the Bates and Stephenson cases are each very problematic in their
own right, they foreshadow an even more serious controversy. After those
cases, it seems quite likely that Kentucky's confusing residency definition
in conjunction with KRS § 118.176 could create a very serious problem for
the commonwealth in which a gubernatorial election would be cast into
doubt and left unsettled, just as the senate election was in Stephenson. Since
the governor and lieutenant governor are elected on a slate, 38 a dispute as
to the qualifications of one candidate raises questions about the viability of
the entire slate.39 Thus, if the residency status of a candidate for governor
or lieutenant governor were brought into question in a lawsuit filed on elec-
tion eve-and the challenged slate received the highest number of votes
the following day-the state would be faced with a situation in which two
different branches of government would claim the right to determine the
winner of the election. The legislature would claim jurisdiction over the
dispute under section 90 of the Kentucky Constitution,' and the courts
would claim jurisdiction under KRS § 118.176. Such a situation would be
remarkably similar to the Stephenson case, but it would undoubtedly have
much more dire consequences for the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
Such a dispute would have exceptionally undesirable consequences for
the state because of the nature of the governor's office. In the Stephenson
controversy, it was undoubtedly bad for a state senate district to go without
representation for over a year, but at least the legislature was still able to
operate because there were thirty-seven other senators who could conduct
the chamber's business. The executive power, however, is concentrated in
the hands of one person-the governor.4 With a Stephenson-like dispute
over a gubernatorial election, Kentucky's government could be paralyzed,
especially if such a dispute went without a resolution for even a fraction of
36 Id.
37 Joseph Gerth & Tom Loftus, Stephenson Resigns Disputed Seat in Senate, COURIER-J.
(Louisville), Jan. 4, 2oo6, at Ai.
38 Ky. CONST. § 70.
39 See Heleringer v. Brown, 104 S.W.3d 397, 399-400 (Ky. 2003).
40 Section 90 of the Kentucky Constitution gives the legislature exclusive jurisdic-
tion over contested elections for governor and lieutenant governor. In its entirety, it reads:
"Contested elections for Governor and Lieutenant Governor shall be determined by both
Houses of the General Assembly, according to such regulations as may be established by law."
Ky. CONST. § 90.
41 K. CONST. § 69.
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the time it took to resolve the dispute in the Stephenson case. Even though
the previous governor would continue in office until the certification of a
successor,4" the functioning of the state government might be negatively
affected by a popular perception that the sitting governor is nothing but a
powerless figurehead. Perhaps more importantly, any legislative sessions
occurring during the interim period would be fruitless without a strong
governor with a clear mandate to push a legislative agenda and help shape
public opinion.
To avoid this potential debacle, it is necessary to correct the problems
that could allow it to happen (i.e., the poor residency definition and the
poorly-written candidate qualifications challenge statute). This Note now
turns its attention to those issues, examining first the residency definition
issue and secondly the statutory issue.
III. A SOLUTION TO THE RESIDENCY DEFINITION PROBLEM
Kentucky has had residency requirements for governor and lieutenant gov-
ernor candidates since the first state constitution was adopted in 1792. 43
Almost all state constitutions and the United States Constitution contain
residency requirements for candidates for executive office.44 Residency re-
quirements serve the purpose of ensuring that candidates are "exposed to
the problems, needs, and desires of the people whom [they are] to govern,
and [the requirements] also give[ ] the people ... a chance to observe [the
candidates] and gain firsthand knowledge about [their] habits and charac-
ter."41 In other words, residency requirements are intended to be a "means
of achieving the goal of having knowledgeable and qualified people in high
public office. 46
42 Ky. CONST. § 73.
43 Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. II, § 4.
44 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, cl. 4; ALA. CONST. art. V, § 117; ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 2;
ARK. CONST. art. VI, § 5; CAL. CONST. art. V, § 2; COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 4; CONN. CONST. art. IV,
§ 5 & art. VI, § I; DEL. CONST. art. III, § 6; FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 5; GA. CONST. art. V, § i, para.
IV; HAW. CONST. art. V, § I; IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 3; ILL. CONST. art. V, § 3; IND. CONST. art. 5, §
7; IOWA CONST. art. IV, § 6; Ky. CONST. § 72; ME. CONST. art. V, pt. i, § 4; MD. CONST., art. II, § 5;
MASS. CONST. Pt. 2, ch. II, § I, art. II; MICH. CONST. art. V, § 22; MINN. CONST. art. V, § 2; MISS.
CONST. art. 5, § 117; MO. CONST. art. IV, § 3; MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 3; NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 2;
NEV. CONST. art. 5, § 3; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 42; N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 2; N.M. CONST. art.
V, § 3; N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 2; N.C. CONST. art. III, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. V, § 4; OKLA. CONST.
art. VI, § 3 & art. III, § 1; OR. CONST. art. V, § 2; PA. CONST. art. 4, § 5; R.I. CONST. art. II, § I &
art. III, § I; S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 2; S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 2; TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 4; UTAH CONST.
art. VII, § 3; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 23; VA. CONST. art. V, § 3; WASH. CONST. art. III, § 25 & art. VI, §
t; Wis. CONST. art. V, § 2 & art. II1, § I; WYO. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
45 Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 12 11, 1217 (D.N.H.), aff'd, 414 U.S. 8o2 (1973).
46 Id. at 1216 (citing JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 4o6-07 (W. W. Norton & Co. ed. 1987) (1893).
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Though the value of residency requirements has never been ques-
tioned, the exact meaning of "residency" is often puzzling. A few courts
have held that "residency" refers to the place of actual abode,47 while many
others-applying the pure domicile test-have held that it refers to the
place of domicile, meaning a person's true and fixed home to which they
intend to return when they have been absent.48 Though the court in Bates
applied the actual abode test, the pure domicile test is the appropriate resi-
dency definition under Kentucky law.
While the actual abode test merely defines residency in terms of where
a person lives (i.e., where he or she sleeps, receives his or her mail, etc.),
the pure domicile test examines the totality of the circumstances and asks
whether the state of candidacy is the place to which the candidate intends
to return when he or she has been absent.49 The pure domicile test is a
broader definition of residency because, unlike the actual abode test, it
allows individuals to be residents of a state without actually abiding in the
state. The intent of the pure domicile theory is to ensure "that a candidate
is sufficiently familiar with the state without placing undue limitations on
the voters' right to select the candidate of their choice."50 Thus, as will be
elaborated upon below, the pure domicile test does more to further the
goals of residency requirements than does a definition of residency that
merely asks where a person sleeps.51 Not only is it preferable from a policy
standpoint, but an analysis of section 72 and similar constitutional provi-
sions also demonstrates that it is the correct definition from a legal stand-
point.
A. The Pure Domicile Test of Residency is the Correct
Approach Under Kentucky Law
1. Textual Analysis of Section 72from a Comparative and Historical Standpoint
Supports the Pure Domicile Test.-Kentucky did not originally adopt a pure
domicile definition of residency. The commonwealth's first constitution,
adopted in 1792, called for an eligible candidate to have been "a citizen
and inhabitant in this State at least two years next before his election, un-
less he shall have been absent on the public business of the United States
or of this State.""2 It is significant that the constitution referred to residents
"in" Kentucky, rather than residents "of" Kentucky and that it specifically
47 See, e.g., Shain v. Bates, No. o3-CI-oo153, slip op. at 14-18 (Oldham Cir. Ct., Ky. Mar.
26, 2003).
48 See, e.g., State Election Bd. v. Bayh, 52I N.E.zd 1313, 1317 (Ind. 1988) (quoting Bd. of
Med. Registration & Examination v. Turner, i68 N.E.zd 193, 196 (Ind. 196o)).
49 See id.
50 Id. at i3i6.
5i See id.
52 Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. II, § 4.
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denoted the situations in which eligible candidates were allowed to have
been absent from the state during the two-year period. Those provisions
indicate that the framers of the first constitution contemplated that the or-
dinary definition of "residents" should only include those people who actu-
ally reside in the commonwealth. The exception for Kentuckians who had
been outside the state on state or national business, however, indicates that
the framers recognized that the definition of residency should not always
be so limited. The exception also suggests that there was a presumption
under the first constitution that anyone living outside the commonwealth
was not a resident of Kentucky. Otherwise, there would have been no need
to provide a special exception for those who were outside the state because
of service to the commonwealth or the nation.
By the time Kentucky adopted its fourth and current constitution in
1891, the notion that a resident need not actually inhabit the state con-
tinuously had been extended.13 The 1891 constitution simply calls for the
governor and lieutenant governor to have been "residents of Kentucky for
at least six years next preceding their election," 4 rather than residents "in"
the state, as the constitution of 1792 required.55 It also deleted the special
exemption for those serving outside the state on behalf of Kentucky or the
nation. By eliminating that exemption, the 1891 constitution seems to have
ended the presumption that people living outside the state could not be
residents. Otherwise, without the special exception for time spent serving
official business outside the commonwealth, it would be almost impossible
for United States representatives and senators to run for governor under
the current constitution given that the rigors of their congressional duties
essentially demand that they live in Washington, D.C. The 1891 consti-
tution intended to adopt a more expansive definition of residency-one
that includes people who do not actually abide within the commonwealth.
When viewed in light of the experiences of other states, it appears that this
more expansive definition is in fact the pure domicile test.
The first Indiana constitution-the Indiana Constitution of 1816-was
almost identical to Kentucky's first constitution in requiring that the gov-
ernor "reside in" the state unless the governor had to be out of the state
on government business.5 6 Like Kentucky's fourth constitution, Indiana's
second constitution, adopted in 1851, also replaced "reside in" with the
phrase "resident of,"5" and omitted the exception for out-of-state govern-
ment service.5" The Supreme Court of Indiana found "that by eliminating
53 Ky. CONST. § 72.
54 Id.
55 Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. II, § 4.
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the out-of-state government service exclusion but adopting 'resident of'
instead of'resided in' language, the 1851 constitution embraced a pure do-
micile theory." 9 If Indiana, with its nearly identical constitutional history,
has found the change in language from the first to the second constitu-
tion to mean that the state adopted a pure domicile theory, then it would
be logical for the same conclusion to be drawn in Kentucky. Kentucky's
residency requirements for the offices of governor and lieutenant governor
have a constitutional definition that calls for the pure domicile test, but un-
like Indiana, Kentucky courts have applied an actual abode test.
The experience of the state of Missouri also suggests that Kentucky
should apply a pure domicile test to questions of residency in the context
of gubernatorial slates. Missouri has constitutional residency requirements
similar to those of Kentucky's section 72. Sections three and ten of article
IV of the Missouri Constitution require candidates for governor and lieu-
tenant governor to have been residents of Missouri for the ten years pre-
ceding the election.' In a 1972 case involving current Senator Christopher
"Kit" Bond's campaign for governor, the Supreme Court of Missouri ap-
plied a pure domicile test to determine whether Bond was qualified to run
for governor.61 Despite the fact that Bond's actual abode had been outside
the state of Missouri for most of the ten years immediately prior to the
election, 6 the court found that he had been a resident of Missouri for that
entire period.
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the state constitution "does
not mean and require actual, physical presence, continuous and uninter-
rupted for ten years. ' 63 Instead, the word "residence" was found to mean
"domicile" under the Missouri Constitution. 64 The court further added
that:
A person can have but one domicile, which when once established, contin-
ues until he renounces it and takes up another in its stead. In order to effec-
tuate a change it is necessary that there shall be actual personal presence in
the new place and also the present intention to remain there, either
59 Id.
60 Mo. CONsT. art. IV, §§ 3, 1o. Section three prescribes the qualifications for the office of
governor, and section ten provides that the same qualifications for the office of governor shall
apply to the office of lieutenant governor. Id.
61 State ex rel. King v. Walsh, 484 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. 1972).
62 Id. at 642. Bond lived in Charlottesville, Virginia while attending law school at the
University of Virginia from 196o to 1963; he lived in New York City during the summer of
1961 and in Atlanta, Georgia, during the summer of 1962; he lived in Atlanta, Georgia, from
1963 to 1964 while clerking for the chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit; and he lived in Washington, D.C., from 1964 to 1967 while working for a Washington
law firm.
63 Id. at 644.
64 Id.
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permanently or for an indefinite time, without any fixed or certain purpose
to return to the former place of abode.
65
Since there is virtually no difference between Kentucky's residency re-
quirements and Missouri's, other than the number of years required, the
Missouri Supreme Court's interpretation of residency should provide guid-
ance to Kentucky decisionmakers. The fact that both Missouri and In-
diana use the pure domicile test should make it even more appealing to
Kentucky courts.
When the textual evolution of section 72 is analyzed and compared to
the interpretations given to similar constitutional provisions from other
states, it seems that the pure domicile definition of residency is the cor-
rect constitutional standard for judging the qualifications of a candidate for
governor or lieutenant governor. This conclusion is further supported by
Kentucky case law interpreting similar provisions in the Kentucky Consti-
tution.
2. Interpreting Section 72 in Light of Case Law Pertaining to Similar Provisions
in the Kentucky Constitution also Indicates that the Pure Domicile Test is the Correct
Definition of Residency.-While Kentucky appellate courts have never inter-
preted the residency requirements found in section 72 of the constitution,
they have interpreted similar requirements found in other sections. 66 The
residency requirement found in section 145 of the Kentucky Constitution,
which establishes the qualifications of voters, has always been interpreted
under a pure domicile theory. In construing that section in Elam v. Mag-
gard,6' Kentucky's highest court found that "the word 'reside,' as used in
section 145, has always been construed by this Court to be equivalent to
'legal domicile,' as distinguished from the place of actual abode. '68 In elab-
orating on the concept of domicile, the court noted that:
In law, every person has a domicile. In some instances it may be different
from his actual abode. Until he has changed it (which is a combination of act
and intention), it continues to be his domicile in law. Where one has had an
actual domicile, and departs from it temporarily, intending to return, it will
remain his legal domicile for all purposes.
69
65 Id. at 645 (quoting In re Toler's Estate, 325 S.W.2d 755, 759 (Mo. 1959)).
66 See, e.g., Everman v. Thomas, 197 S.W.2d 58 (Ky. 1946); Elam v. Maggard, 178 S.W
IO65 (Ky. 1915).
67 Elam, 178 SW. at Io65.
68 Id.
69 Id. (quoting Erwin v. Benton, 87 SW. 291, 294 (Ky. 19o5)).
2oo6-2oo7]
222 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 95
In Everman v. Thomas,70 the court reinforced the domicile theory ap-
proach to the determination of residency. After repeating much of the lan-
guage from the Elam case, Everman points out that "a temporary abode
for purposes of business, pleasure, or otherwise does not result in the loss
of residence."'" The court then went on to apply the same multi-factored
analysis used in Elam, looking first at the factual situation surrounding the
voter's domicile (e.g., where the voter was actually living, how long he or
she had been there, the reasons behind his or her decision to abide in that
place, his or her connections with the purported place of residence, etc.)
and then looking at the voter's intentions (i.e., whether he or she actually
intended for the absence from the place of his or her purported residence
to be temporary)."2 In other words, in determining residency under section
145, Kentucky courts have consistently based their decisions not on the
voter's actual place of abode, 3 but rather on the voter's domicile, which is
defined as "the place where a person has his true, fixed, permanent home
and principal establishment, and to which place he has, whenever he is
absent, the intention of returning."7
4
There are a number of reasons why Kentucky courts should adopt the
same definition of residency under section 72 as they have under section
145. For example, if Kentucky has interpreted the seemingly narrow "re-
side in" language of section 145 in light of the broader pure domicile test,
then the more open concept of residency represented by the "resident of"
language in section 72 should certainly be interpreted using the pure domi-
cile test instead of a more restrictive test that focuses on the place of actual
abode. 75 In addition, the plain language of the Elam opinion says that the
definition of residency provided by the court applies "for all purposes,"' 6
70 Everman, 197 S.W.2d at 58.
71 Id. at 66 (citing 18 AM. JUR. Elections §§ 58-59 (1938)).
72 See Elam, 178 S.W. at io65;Everman, 197 S.W.zd at 63-69.
73 While it is true that actual abode is a factor in determining the place of domicile, it is
certainly not the determining factor. See State ex re. King v. Walsh, 484 S.W.2d 641, 644 (Mo.
1972) (stating that "residence is largely a matter of intention, to be determined not only from
the utterances of the person whose residence is in issue but also from his acts and in the
light of all the facts and circumstances of the case"). Actual abode is more important to the
domicile inquiry when a person claims to have established a new domicile, as opposed to a
situation in which a person claims to have retained their original domicile. To establish a new
domicile, a person must both actually abide in the new place, and must have an intention to
make that place their permanent domicile and abandon their original domicile. To retain their
original domicile, however, a person must merely demonstrate-based on the totality of the
circumstances-that he or she never intended to abandon the original domicile. See id. at 645
n.4 (explaining the differences between claiming to establish a new domicile and claiming
retention of the original domicile).
74 State Election Bd. v. Bayh, 521 N.E.zd 1313, 1317 (Ind. t988) (quoting Bd. of Med.
Registration & Examination v. Turner, 168 N.E.2d 193, 196 (Ind. 196o)).
75 See supra notes 47-48.
76 Elam, 178 S.W. at 1o65.
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and not just for determining voter qualifications. Kentucky decisions in-
terpreting similar provisions of the state constitution, therefore, provide
additional proof that the pure domicile test is the correct definition of resi-
dency.
B. The Pure Domicile Test is Also the Correct Definition
in Light of Policy Considerations.
Not only is the pure domicile definition legally sound, it also makes for
sound policy. As previously mentioned, the goal of residency requirements
is to ensure that candidates are familiar with the issues facing the state and
that voters are familiar with the character and merits of the candidates. 77 As
the Supreme Court of Indiana noted in the Bayh case, "[u]sing traditional
legal notions of domicile as a way of determining a candidate's status as 'a
resident of the State' furthers [those] purposes. ' 78 While a definition focus-
ing on actual abode might also further these goals to some degree, it is not
the optimal solution because it is too restrictive. Not only does the domi-
ciliary concept advance these goals, but it does so "without placing undue
limitations on the voters' right to select the candidate of their choice." '79
In addition, the pure domicile definition should be used in Kentucky be-
cause our system of government "works best on the basis of maximum
rather than minimum participation in democracy."' 0 Accordingly, residency
requirements should be interpreted as broadly as possible so as to effectu-
ate, rather than prohibit, candidacy.
A domiciliary definition of residency would also do more to assuage
Kentucky's much-lamented brain drain.8' It is certainly in the common-
wealth's best interest to make it more convenient for skilled persons like
Hunter Bates to return and play a significant role in the public affairs of
the state. People like Bates gain invaluable experience during their tempo-
rary absences from the state, and it is senseless to prevent Kentucky from
benefiting from that experience. We live in a relatively flat world in which
people frequently move from place to place gaining education, experience,
and expertise, but without actually changing their state of domicile. It is
undoubtedly in Kentucky's best interest for its citizens to get the best of
what the world has to offer and bring that knowledge and experience back
to the commonwealth. Kentucky should encourage those people to use
their expertise for the public benefit of the state. To that end, it does not
77 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
78 Bayh, 521 N.E.zd at 1316.
79 Id.
8o Id.
81 See, e.g., Ky. LONG-TERM POLICY RESEARCH CTR., POLICY NOTES: KENTUCKY'S BRAIN
DRAIN UNPLUGGED, (2oo I), http://www.kltprc.net/policynotes/Chpt-3.htm.
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make sense for Kentucky law to make it more difficult for such people to
hold public office.
It is also nonsensical for Kentucky to discourage its citizens from serv-
ing in the United States government or military. Under the current state of
the law, Kentuckians who are required to live outside the state for a period
of time while on government or military service are not eligible to run for
governor or lieutenant governor upon their return to the state. Surely Ken-
tucky's law was never intended to have such an unpatriotic effect. It is not
fair to preclude the candidacy of a public servant or soldier simply because
he or she is required to live outside the state while serving our country.
Thus, the pure domicile test is the most appropriate definition for resi-
dency in light of both legal and policy considerations. Consequently, the
Commonwealth of Kentucky would be best served if the courts would
abandon the "actual abode" definition and recognize the pure domicile test.
If the courts will not do that, however, the people of the commonwealth
should effectuate that change by encouraging legislators to rewrite section
72 of the Kentucky Constitution. The best way to frame the language so
as to avoid the current problems is to require candidates for governor and
lieutenant governor to be citizens of the United States and residents of
Kentucky and to explicitly define residency in terms of the pure domicile
test. Such an amendment would give independent and operative meanings
to the words "citizen" and "resident" and would leave absolutely no room
for anything other than a pure domicile definition." In the alternative, if
the courts refuse to recognize that the pure domicile definition is the true
constitutional definition of residency and the citizens of Kentucky are not
persuaded to amend the constitution so as to explicitly adopt a pure do-
micile definition of residency, the policy objectives of the pure domicile
approach could be partially fulfilled by amending the constitution to rein-
state the out-of-state government service exception that existed under the
first state constitution.83 Nevertheless, taking that measure is the minimum
that should be done given that the pure domicile approach clearly goes the
furthest in satisfying the relevant policy concerns and is also the most ap-
propriate method of defining residency in terms of pure legal analysis.
C. How the Bates Court Interpreted the Residency Requirement
Though a pure domicile test appears to be the appropriate approach to
evaluating residency under section 72, the Bates court employed an entire-
ly different approach. Placing particular emphasis on the reasoning from
82 See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
83 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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the cases of Noble v. Meagher" and Mobley v. Armstrong,85 and specifically
stating that Mobley was "precisely on point," 6 the Oldham Circuit Court
applied a test that focused on actual residence instead of domicile.87 In
Mobley, the residency of a candidate for district judgeship was brought into
question.88 The Mobley court followed the guidance of Noble,89 which said
that "[tihe proper statutory standard to determine the residence of a non-
partisan judicial candidate is set out in KRS § 118.015(7), which states that
the word 'residence' used in reference to a candidate shall mean actual
residence of the candidate without regard to the residence of the spouse of
the candidate."' The Mobley case further defined residence as "an abode
where someone actually lives."9'
Aside from the Mobley-Noble line of cases, the Oldham Circuit Court also
relied on the logic of the case of Ravenel v. Dekle2 from South Carolina.93
In that case, the Supreme Court of South Carolina found that because the
state constitution requires an eligible candidate for governor to have been
both a resident and citizen of the state for five years, 94 it must be the case
that the term "resident" refers to the actual place of abode, rather than the
candidate's domicile.95 The court said that to find otherwise would render
the term "citizen" useless, which would violate the fundamental principle
that "effect should be given to every part and every word of a constitu-
tion."'" Specifically, the court reasoned:
If the framers of the particular constitutional provision meant to require
nothing more than a domicile they could have stopped after using the word
"citizen" and omitted the words "and resident". "Resident", in the domi-
ciliary sense is embodied within the term "citizen". It follows therefore that
if the words "and resident" be construed as meaning anything other than a
requirement of actual physical residence such language would be surplus-
age.
97
84 Noble v. Meagher, 686 S.W.zd 458 (Ky. 1985).
85 Mobley v. Armstrong, 978 S.W.zd 307 (Ky. 1998).
86 Shain v. Bates, No. o3-CI-oo153, slip op. at 15 (Oldham Cir. Ct., Ky. Mar. 26, 2003).
87 Id. at 14, 18.
88 Mobley, 978 S.W.zd at 308.
89 Id. at 310.
90 Noble v. Meagher, 686 S.W.zd 458,462 (Ky. 1985).
91 Mobley, 978 S.W2d at 310.
92 Ravenel v. Dekle, 218 S.E.2d 521, 527 (S.C. 1975).
93 Shain v. Bates, No. 03-CI-o0153, slip op. at io (Oldham Cit. Ct., Ky. Mar. 26, 2003).
94 S.C. CON T. art. IV, § 2.
95 Ravenel, 218 S.E.2d at 527.




Echoing that logic, the Oldham circuit judge found that an approach
focusing on the candidate's actual abode must be used because each word
in the constitution "should be given an independent and operative mean-
ing,""8 and the use of the domicile approach to residency would render the
word "citizen" in section 72 superfluous.99
D. Second Guessing the Bates Result
While the use of the actual abode test in the Bates decision may seem cor-
rect at first blush because of the Mobley-Noble line of cases and the Ravenel
case, it is actually inapposite because reliance on those cases is misplaced.
The holdings of Mobley and Noble should not be applied to cases inter-
preting section 72 of the Kentucky Constitution because those cases de-
fine residency based entirely on KRS § 118.015(7).100 Reliance on KRS §
118.015(7) in evaluating the residency requirements of section 72 is wrong
for a number of reasons. First, the residency requirements found in sec-
tion 72 are constitutional requirements. As such, the terms and provisions
contained within the section must be defined and interpreted according
to constitutional precepts, and they cannot be altered, elaborated upon, or
modified in any way by ordinary legislation, such as KRS § 118.015(7). °,
As discussed previously,102 the language "resident of" in section 72 has .an
existing constitutional meaning that requires the application of the pure
domicile test, and that definition cannot be altered by ordinary legislation.
In the words of both Noble and Mobley, KRS § 118.015(7) is a mere "statu-
tory standard."'' 03 The definition of residency under section 72, however, is
a constitutional standard, and it is axiomatic that constitutional provisions
cannot be changed by statutes. Thus, the section 72 definition cannot be
elaborated upon or altered by a statutory provision.
In addition, KRS § 118.015(7) should not be used to interpret section 72
because the application of KRS § 118.015(7) is limited in application, by its
very terms, to chapter 118 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. 104 As a result,
it does not seem that KRS § 118.015(7) was intended to provide guidance
for interpreting section 72 of the Kentucky Constitution. Furthermore,
chapter 118 is exclusively about the conduct of elections, which means that
it has no logical connection to interpreting candidate qualifications under
98 Shain, No. o3-CI-oo153, slip op. at io.
99 Id. at 13.
IOO Mobley v. Armstrong, 978 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Ky. 1998); Noble v. Meagher, 686 S.W.2d
458,462 (Ky. 1985).
ioi See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
102 See supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
103 Mobley, 978 S.W.2d at 3 I o; Noble, 686 S.W.2d at 462.
104 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § ii8.o15 (West 2oo6).
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section 72 of the constitution. Therefore, it is altogether inappropriate to
read KRS § 118.015(7) as the definition of residency under section 72.
Reliance on the reasoning in the Ravenel decision is also inappropriate
because it is not logically sound. The logic behind Ravenel is that the words
"citizen" and "resident" can only have independent, operative meanings if
"resident" is given an actual abode definition rather than a pure domicile
definition. Thus, the Ravenel logic assumes that the words "citizen" and
"resident" in section 72 have the same meaning under a pure domicile
definition of residency. That logic is a non-sequitur. The words "citizen"
and "resident" can be given independent, operative meanings under the
pure domicile test because there is a distinct difference between a citizen
and a resident. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution defines a citizen of a state as a person who is born or naturalized in
the United States and is also resident of the state."°5 Thus, to qualify as a
citizen of Kentucky, one must be born in the United States or be a natural-
ized United States citizen and must also be a resident of Kentucky.16 Since
residency is merely a component part of state citizenship, it is clear that
residency itself cannot mean the same thing as citizenship. One can eas-
ily imagine a scenario in which an individual can be considered a resident
under the pure domicile test, yet fail to be a citizen. Such a result would
happen, for example, if an alien moved to Kentucky and indisputably es-
tablished the commonwealth as his domicile (i.e., his permanent home to
which he intended to return after temporary absences) but did not acquire
United States citizenship. In that case, the alien would be a resident of
Kentucky, but would not be a citizen of the state because he would not
have been born or naturalized in the United States'07 Therefore, under the
wording of section 72,08 it does not necessarily follow that one who has met
the necessary requirements to be considered a resident of Kentucky under
105 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has said that
"In order to be a citizen of a State within the meaning of the diversity statute, a natural person
must both be a citizen of the United States and be domiciled within the State." Newman-
Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 828 (1989) (citing Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S.
646, 649 (1878); Brown v. Keene, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) i i, 115 (1834)). While not speaking to the
exact same issue, the quote tends to illustrate the general difference between citizenship and
domiciliary residence.
io6 Using a pure domicile definition of residency, this means that to be a citizen of
Kentucky, one must be born or naturalized in the United States and must have established
Kentucky as his true and permanent home to which he intends to return when he has been
absent.
i07 See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
io8 "The Governor and Lieutenant Governor shall be at least thirty years of age, and
have been citizens and residents of Kentucky for at least six years next preceding their elec-
tion. The duties of the Lieutenant Governor shall be prescribed by law, and he shall have such
other duties as delegated by the Governor." Ky. CONST. §72.
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the pure domicile test has also met the necessary requirements of state
citizenship.
Because it is possible for a person to be a resident of Kentucky without
being a citizen of Kentucky, the word "citizen" in section 72 can be given
an independent and operative meaning if the domiciliary approach to resi-
dence is adopted. As such, the reasoning found in Ravenel seems flawed.
It appears even more flawed considering that of all the states that require
governors and lieutenant governors to be both citizens and residents of
the state, only the courts of South Carolina, Maryland, and now Kentucky,
have ruled that residency must be defined as the place of actual abode in
order to give meaning to the "citizen" language. 109 In any event, the Ravenel
logic should not be followed in defining residency under section 72, and
residency under that section should not be defined according to the place
of actual abode. If actual abode is not the appropriate definition, then the
correct definition must necessarily be the pure domicile test.
E. The Pure Domicile Test Applied to the Bates Facts
Had the pure domicile test been applied in the Bates case, Hunter Bates'
candidacy certainly would not have been prohibited. In fact, the circuit
judge found that Bates had maintained Kentucky as his legal domicile dur-
ing the entire period of his physical absence from the state."' The judge
was entirely correct in that regard because all of the facts clearly indicate
that Kentucky was Bates' true, fixed, permanent home and principal es-
tablishment to which he intended to return after temporary absences."'
For example, Bates was born and raised in Kentucky, went to college in
Kentucky, clerked for a federal judge in Kentucky following law school,
had always voted in Kentucky, has owned real estate in Kentucky for most
of his adult life, and has remained an active member of the Kentucky Bar
Association since beginning his professional career."'
Not only was Bates closely tied to Kentucky before temporarily leaving
the state, but his absence was also inextricably linked to Kentucky. During
the time Bates lived in the Washington, D.C. area, he spent the vast major-
ity of his time serving the Commonwealth of Kentucky on the staff of Sen-
ator Mitch McConnell, eventually rising to the rank of chief of staff."3 His
io9 State Election Bd. v. Bayh, 521 N.E.2d 1313, 1316 (Ind. 1988) (citing Ravenel v.
Dekle, 218 S.E.2d 521, 527 (S.C. 1975); Sec'y of State v. McGucken, 222 A.2d 693, 695-96
(Md. 1966)).
I10 Shain v. Bates, No. 03-CI-o0153, slip op. at 14-16 (Oldham Cir. Ct., Ky. Mar. 26,
2003).
111 Id. at 13-17.
112 Memorandum of Respondent at 9, Shain v. Bates, No. o3-CI-oo153 (Oldham Cir. Ct.,
Ky. Mar. 26, 2003).
113 Id. at 6.
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work in Senator McConnell's office required him to be intimately familiar
with the issues facing Kentucky and required him to make frequent trips
to the commonwealth." 4 Furthermore, all accounts indicate that Bates' ab-
sence from Kentucky was intended to be merely temporary. When Bates
first went to work for Senator McConnell, it was on the understanding that
his "commitment was for a two-year session of Congress.""' After that pe-
riod though, Senator McConnell became the chairman of the Senate Rules
Committee. As a result, he asked Bates to stay on as chief counsel to the
rules committee and "delay his return [to Kentucky] until the last year of
[McConnell's] Senate term, 2002."16
In 2002, Bates fulfilled his intention to return to Kentucky permanently
and took on the task of managing Senator McConnell's re-election cam-
paign-a job that undoubtedly required an exceedingly high level of fa-
miliarity with the state. That job, and the other positions that he held over
the previous seven years, were high profile posts that easily allowed the
people of Kentucky to become familiar with his character and merits. In
short, Bates' candidacy should have been allowed because Kentucky was
clearly his domicile. At the very least, his superior knowledge of the state
and the fact that the state's citizens had the opportunity to become familiar
with him demonstrate that his candidacy would have fulfilled the spirit of
the residency requirements.
That conclusion seems all the more appropriate in light of the experi-
ences of other states. Bates' case is similar to the Bayh case from Indiana
and the Bondcase from Missouri. The Bayh case concerned Evan Bayh, the
current junior senator from Indiana. In 1988, he was pursuing the gover-
nor's office in that state."7 His candidacy was brought into question on the
grounds that he had not been a resident of Indiana for the requisite five year
period preceding the election."' The Supreme Court of Indiana found that
Bayh-who had lived in Washington, D.C., from 1982-1984 while working
for a private law firm there-had maintained his Indiana residency despite
the fact that his actual abode was outside the state for a significant portion
of the five-year period." 9
Bond's case arose in the midst of his campaign for governor of Missouri
in 1972. I2 ° Bond had also spent significant time living outside the state in
which he was running for office. He spent practically the entire decade be-
fore his candidacy abiding in Virginia, New York, Georgia, and Washington,
14 Id. at 7.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 8.
117 See State Election Bd. v. Bayh, 521 N.E.2d 1313, 1314 (Ind. 1988).
ii8 See id.
II9 See id. at 1318.
zo State ex rel. King v. Walsh, 484 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. 1972).
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D.C., but not Missouri."'1 Like Bayh, he too was found to have fulfilled the
residency requirements of his state.'
In some ways, Bates' case was stronger than both Bayh's and Bond's. For
instance, Bates spent the vast majority of his time in Washington working
for a Kentucky senator," 3 while Bayh and Bond spent their time in Wash-
ington working for private law firms;2 4 Bates clerked for a federal judge in
Kentucky after graduating from law school,2 5 while Bond clerked for a fed-
eral judge in Georgia;2 6 and Bates was admitted to the bar in Kentucky,"7
while Bond was not admitted to the Missouri Bar. 8 Thus, in those ways,
it seems that Bates maintained stronger ties with his native state than did
Bayh or Bond. In that light, there is no good reason why Bates should have
been disqualified when Bayh and Bond were not.
Bates' disqualification seems even more anomalous when considered
alongside the situations of several other public servants who have been
elected after periods of temporary absence from their home states. In 2002,
for example, Mitt Romney was elected governor of Massachusetts after
having lived-and owned a home-in Utah for the three previous years
while serving as the head of the 2002 Winter Olympics Organizing Com-
mittee.2 9 In addition, Mitch Daniels was elected governor of Indiana in
2004 after having served in Washington, D.C., from 2001 to 2003 as Presi-
dent Bush's director of the Office of Management and Budget;30 Haley
Barbour was elected governor of Mississippi in 2003 despite having lived
in the Washington, D.C., area for most of the previous two decades; 3' Bill
Richardson was elected governor of New Mexico in 2002 despite having
been absent from the state for the previous five years while serving as the
United States ambassador to the United Nations and then as secretary of
energy. 32 It is quite common for people to run for, and win, executive of-
fices in states in which they would not qualify as residents if their residency
121 Id. at 641.
122 Id. at 644.
123 Shain v. Bates, No. o3-CI-oo 53, slip op. at 3 (Oldham Cir. Ct., Ky. Mar. 26, 2003).
124 Bayh, 5zi N.E.zd at 1315; King, 484 S.W.2d at 642-44.
125 Shain, No. o3-CI-oo153, slip op. at 2.
126 King, 484 S.W.2d at 643.
127 Shain, No. o3-CI-oo153, slip op. at 6.
IZ8 King, 484 S.W.2d at 642.
129 Stephanie Ebbert, Romney Stays on Ballot: Democrats Lose a Unanimous Vote, BosToN
GLOBE, June z6, 2002, at Ai.
130 State of Ind., Official Indiana Governor's Website, http://www.in.gov/gov/bio/index.
html (last visted Sept. 1o, 2oo6).
131 Scott M. Larson, Barbour Says He Can Get Things Done, HATTIESBURG AM., Feb. 18,
2003, at 2A.
132 State of N.M., Official New Mexico Governor's Website, http://www/governor.nm.us/
governor.php (last visted Sept. 10, 2oo6).
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were determined according to an actual abode test rather than a pure domi-
cile test. Most states-including Kentucky, it seems, until at least 1979-
have recognized the benefits of a pure domicile test, and it would be best
for Kentucky to do so once again.
Having come to a conclusion about the correct definition of residency,
it is now prudent to examine the problems concerning which branch of
government gets to decide issues of residency at different stages in the
electoral process. A solid definition of residency will do little to prevent
future uncertainty and clashes between branches without a solution to the
problem of jurisdiction over residency disputes.
IV. THE KRS § 118.176 PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTION
KRS § 118.176(2) currently allows the bonafides of any candidate to be
challenged by a motion in circuit court at "any time prior to the general
election." '133 This provision undoubtedly fulfills the beneficial function of
providing the electorate with a method of challenging the eligibility of can-
didates with questionable qualifications. Unfortunately, its utility is over-
shadowed by one major flaw. The problem with KRS § 118.176(2) is that
it does not establish a clear line between the point at which the judiciary's
jurisdiction over bonafides challenges ends and the legislature's jurisdiction
over election contests begins. 134 The problem most obviously manifests it-
self in situations like the one presented in the Stephenson case, where the
bonafides challenge is filed the day before the general election and decided
by the court at some time subsequent to the closing of the polls. 3 If such
a scenario were to occur with regard to a gubernatorial election, it would
be unclear as to whether the judiciary would have jurisdiction by virtue
133 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118.176(2) (West 2006). In its entirety, subsection (2) reads:
The bona fides of any candidate seeking nomination or election in a
primary or general election may be questioned by any qualified voter
entitled to vote for such candidate or by an opposing candidate by
summary proceedings consisting of a motion before the Circuit Court
of the judicial circuit in which the candidate whose bona fides is
questioned resides. An action regarding the bona fides of any candidate
seeking nomination or election in a primary or general election may be
commenced at any time prior to the general election. The motion shall
be tried summarily and without delay. Proof may be heard orally, and
upon motion of either party shall be officially reported. If the Circuit
Judge of the circuit in which the proceeding is filed is disqualified or
absent from the county or is himself a candidate, the proceeding may
be presented to, heard and determined by the Circuit Judge of any
adjoining judicial circuit.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § i 18.176(2) (West 2006).




of the fact that the challenge was filed pursuant to KRS § 118.176 prior to
the start of the election, or whether the legislature would have jurisdiction
under section 90 of the Kentucky Constitution by virtue of the fact that
the dispute had been transformed into an election contest when the polls
closed.
13 6
To prevent such an undesirable controversy, it is necessary to amend
either KRS § 118.176 or section 90 of the Kentucky Constitution so that
it will not be possible for those types of situations to arise. If one of those
two sections must be changed, the statute-rather than the constitutional
provision-should be changed. Amending section 90 is not the optimal
solution because it is much more practical and convenient to rewrite KRS
§ 118.176.' 37 In addition, given that the substance of section 90 has been a
136 The Stephenson case does not definitively resolve this controversy because it applies
to state senators, which are covered by different constitutional provisions than the governor
and lieutenant governor. Plus, even if that case were held to apply to gubernatorial elections, it
would not truly resolve anything because the legislature could ignore the court and attempt to
decide the dispute for itself. That would quite simply result in warfare between the courts and
the legislature. While Dana Stephenson chose to respect the decision of the Supreme Court of
Kentucky, there is nothing other than feelings of personal integrity and honor to dictate such
a result. It is quite possible for a less honorable candidate to plunge the state into a severe
constitutional crisis by pressing ahead and taking his or her case to the legislature against the
command of the supreme court. This should be changed so that we no longer have to rely on
the character and integrity of candidates to avoid such crises.
137 In order to replace the current KRS § i 18. 176 with new wording, the legislature would
merely have to follow the routine requirements for enacting any other piece of legislation
-which essentially entails a majority vote in favor of the final form of the bill in both houses
of the legislature followed by presentment to the governor for his approval. See Ky. CONST. §§
46,56. Amending section 90 of the Kentucky Constitution, on the other hand, would require a
more difficult and complicated procedure. Section 256 of the Kentucky Constitution provides
the mechanism for amending the state constitution. In its entirety, it reads:
Amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in either House
of the General Assembly at a regular session, and if such amendment
or amendments shall be agreed to by three-fifths of all the members
elected to each House, such proposed amendment or amendments,
with the yeas and nays of the members of each House taken thereon,
shall be entered in full in their respective journals. Then such proposed
amendment or amendments shall be submitted to the voters of the State
for their ratification or rejection at the next general election for members
of the House of Representatives, the vote to be taken thereon in such
manner as the General Assembly may provide, and to be certified by the
officers of election to the Secretary of State in such manner as shall be
provided by law, which vote shall be compared and certified by the same
board authorized by law to compare the polls and give certificates of
election to officers for the State at large. If it shall appear that a majority
of the votes cast for and against an amendment at said election was for
the amendment, then the same shall become a part of the Constitution
of this Commonwealth, and shall be so proclaimed by the Governor, and
published in such manner as the General Assembly may direct. Said
[VOL. 95
KENTUCKY RESIDENCY DEFINITION
part of the Kentucky Constitution for over 200 years,'38 and KRS § 118.176
has only been on the books in its present form since 2001,1 39 there seems to
be some wisdom in the notion that section 90 should be retained and any
changes should be made to KRS § 118.176. Furthermore, the state con-
stitution is the supreme authority within the realm of state law.' 4 Thus, if
change needs to be made, the statutory provision should be changed rather
than the constitutional provision.
Having determined that KRS § 118.176 should be retooled, the much
more important question becomes how exactly it should be written. To an-
swer that question, it is necessary to understand the statute's background.
A. The Story Behind KRS § 118.176
KRS § 118.176 has existed in one form or another since 1974, having taken
its present form in 2001.141 Prior to 2001, the statute only permitted the
courts to hear bonafides challenges up until the primary election. 42 The
general assembly amended the law in 2001 in response to the outcome of
Legate v. Stone.143 That case concerned the democratic primary for the office
of councilperson in the city of Madisonville, Kentucky.144 Legate and Stone
were both candidates for the democratic nomination. 145 On the day of the
primary, however, it was discovered that Legate was actually a registered
amendments shall not be submitted at an election which occurs less
than ninety days from the final passage of such proposed amendment or
amendments. Not more than four amendments shall be voted upon at
any one time. If two or more amendments shall be submitted at the same
time, they shall be submitted in such manner that the electors shall vote
for or against each of such amendments separately, but an amendment
may relate to a single subject or to related subject matters and may amend
or modify as many articles and as many sections of the Constitution as
may be necessary and appropriate in order to accomplish the objectives
of the amendment. The approval of the Governor shall not be necessary
to any bill, order, resolution or vote of the General Assembly, proposing
an amendment or amendments to this Constitution
Ky. CONST. § 256
138 Ky. CONST. of 1799, art. III, § 27.
139 See Stephenson v. Woodward, 182 S.W.3d 162, 172 (Ky. 2oo5 ) (noting that the statute
was most recently amended in 2001).
140 I6 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §7 (2005) (citing Burling v. Chandler, 804 A.2d 471 (N.H.
2002)).
141 See Stephenson, 182 S.W.3 d at 172.
142 See id.
143 Id.; see also id. at 172 n.5 ("The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this matter (Legate






republican.' 6 Legate won the primary, and then Stone filed a challenge
to disqualify him pursuant to KRS § 118.176.147 The circuit-court ruled in
Stone's favor, but the Court of Appeals "reversed with directions to dismiss
the action, concluding that KRS § 118.176 motions filed after the primary
election are untimely." 148 The Kentucky Supreme Court then denied dis-
cretionary review, and Madisonville democrats were stuck with a republi-
can on their ticket.1
49
When the general assembly met in 2001, it set out to amend KRS §
118.176 in order to prevent the Madisonville embarrassment from happen-
ing again.i0 The initial proposal would have allowed bonafides challenges
to be filed in court before or after the primary or general election.' The
version that originally became law, the current statute, only allows chal-
lenges to be filed in court before the general election. 52 Comments made
by representatives during a session of the House Committee on Elections,
Constitutional Amendments, and Intergovernmental Affairs show that the
final version of the bill did not give the courts jurisdiction over bonafides
challenges filed after the general election because "after an election, 'can-
didates' are no longer 'candidates' and therefore cannot be the subject of
KRS § 118.176 actions."' 153
In light of the legislative history, it seems that the general assembly
intended the judiciary's jurisdiction over candidate bonafides challenges to
evaporate after the general election. If the courts exercise jurisdiction after
the general election, the case cannot properly be termed a candidate bona
fides challenge because there simply are no candidates anymore once the
general election has taken place. 5 4 Considering that the state constitution
gives the legislature exclusive jurisdiction over such disputes after the gen-
eral election, it is unlikely that the legislature would have written a statute
that also allows the courts to exercise jurisdiction after the general election.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held in Stephenson that KRS
§ 118.176 provides the courts with jurisdiction after the general election
so long as the challenge is filed before the election. 15 5 As previously men-
tioned, this creates tension with the legislature's constitutional endowment





150 Id. at 172-73.
151 Id. (citing Ky. H.J. REG. SESS. i6o-6i (2001)).
152 Id. at 173.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 186-87 (Roach, J., dissenting) (quoting Stephenson v. Woodward, No. 2005-SC-
oo96-TG, 2005 WL 629002, at *7-8 (Ky. Mar. 1 7, 2005) (Keller, J., dissenting)).
155 Id. at 168.
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Stephenson v. Woodward could take years and would require the state to suf-
fer through another crisis like the one in that case, the most practical way
to avoid the tension is to simply rewrite KRS § 118.176. Thus, the question
now becomes how to rewrite the statute.
B. A Proposed Alternative to the Current Form of KRS § 118.176
A rewritten KRS § 118.176 must find a way to balance several competing
interests. On one hand, it must provide a way to prevent a Stephenson-like
situation in which both the judiciary and legislature claim jurisdiction be-
cause the action is filed in court immediately before the general election
and then decided afterward. There must also be some way to ensure that
candidates are not able to delay challenging their opponents' qualifications
until late in the campaign season. When a candidate is disqualified close to
the date of the general election, it is normally too late for another candidate
to step in and run a meaningful campaign. Late disqualifications are also
contrary to the public interest because they have the potential to harm our
two-party system by effectively leaving one party out of the general elec-
tion. 116 Finally, a rewritten KRS § 118.176 must also protect the public's
interest in guaranteeing that only qualified candidates appear on the bal-
lot. Thus, the most desirable scheme for pre-election bonafides challenges
is one that draws a definite boundary between the judiciary's jurisdiction
over pre-election bonafides challenges and the legislature's jurisdiction over
election contests while maximizing the electorate's opportunity to chal-
lenge unqualified candidates and also making certain that the voters will
have a true choice at the polls.
1. Maximizing the Electorate's Opportunity to Challenge Unqualified Candidates
While Also Ensuring that Voters Have a True Choice at the Polls.-As the resi-
dents of Madisonville, Kentucky learned in 2000,157 it is desirable to give
voters a sufficient opportunity to ensure that only qualified candidates ap-
pear on the ballot at the general election. The clear lesson from the Madi-
sonville case is that voters should be allowed to challenge the bonafides of a
candidate after the primary election. This makes sense for a couple of rea-
sons. First, the issue of the candidate's qualifications simply may not arise
prior to the primary election, as was the case in Madisonville. In that situa-
tion, it seems unfair to saddle the electorate with an unqualified candidate
156 See N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 814 A.zd 1028, 1034-35 (N.J. 2002) (noting
that it is in the public interest to preserve the two-party system by submitting to the elector-
ate a ballot bearing the names of candidates of both major parties); see also Davis v. Bandemer,
478 U.S. 1o9, 144-45 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("There can be little doubt that the
emergence of a strong and stable two-party system in this country has contributed enormously
to sound and effective government.").
157 See supra notes 143-49.
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when there are at least five months left until the general election, which
would certainly seem to be enough time to have the candidate disqualified
and have a replacement candidate selected.
Second, the issue of standing poses serious problems to the elector-
ate and the election process if bonafides challenges are not allowed after
the primary. Kentucky's highest court has held that a voter has standing to
maintain a pre-primary challenge of a candidate's qualifications if the voter
"is qualified to vote for the nomination in issue."'56 Thus, a registered dem-
ocrat would not have standing to challenge a republican primary contender,
and vice versa. While it may seem unlikely, it is possible that members of
one party could collude to ensure the victory of an unqualified candidate
in the primary, thereby placing that candidate in a position in which the
candidate's qualifications can no longer be challenged. For example, one
party could recruit a wildly popular individual with no ties to the state to
run for governor, and after that person wins the primary, no one from the
opposing party would ever be able to challenge his or her candidacy.
It may seem unfair for unqualified candidates to win primaries, but the
greatest potential inequity is found in the potential for those candidates
to also win the general election. In some parts of the state, one party has
such a tremendous advantage in registration numberss' that an unqualified
candidate from the majority party could win the general election even after
the candidate's ineligibility comes to light. At that point, the only method
of redressing that injustice would be for the losing candidate to contest the
election.16° There is no reason why the election should have to conclude
before the unqualified candidate can be challenged. Such a system is en-
tirely inefficient. It can only lead to uncertainty on the part of the voters
and higher costs for the state if the initial election is held invalid and an-
other election is required. Thus, there should certainly be some method for
voters to challenge candidates' qualifications after the primary and before
the general election.
While it is sound policy to allow bonafides challenges to be made after
the primary election, it may not be such a good idea to allow those chal-
lenges to be made up until the general election. Not only does this policy
allow for conflicts between the judiciary and legislature, like in the Ste-
phenson situation, but it also raises the possibility that a candidate could be
disqualified so close to the general election that a replacement candidate
could not be fielded in time to make a meaningful campaign. As a result,
the voters in such a scenario would be deprived of the opportunity to have
I58 Fletcher v. Wilson, 495 S.W.zd 787, 794 (Ky. 1973).
159 In Breathitt County in 2006, for example, there are 9,821 registered democrats and
only 627 registered republicans, and in Leslie County, there are 978 democrats and 8,173
republicans. Commonwealth of Ky. State Bd. of Elections, Voter Registration Statistics Report
(2oo6), http://elect.ky.gov/stats/regstat.htm.
i6o See Ky. CONST. §§ 38, 9o; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120.155 (West zoo6).
[Vol. 95
KENTUCKY RESIDENCY DEFINITION
a choice between candidates. In addition, the two-party system, which is
a hallmark of American politics, would be damaged because the public
would likely be without the chance to choose between two major party
candidates. Even if the party of the disqualified candidate were to put a
replacement candidate on the ballot, it is conceivable that voters might feel
that, in practical effect, they have no true choice since the appearance of
the substitute candidate has occurred too late for them to evaluate the new
candidate's positions. In short, there has to be some way to guarantee that
candidates are not disqualified late in the game.
To maximize the opportunity of voters to challenge unqualified can-
didates while minimizing the potential for voters to be left without a true
choice and one party to be left without a candidate, it seems that bonafides
challenges should be allowed after the primary but not up to the date of the
general election, as the current form of KRS § 118.176 allows. In that re-
gard, Mississippi's post-primary candidate qualifications statute61 provides
a good model for a rewritten KRS § 118.176. Section 23-15-963 of the
Mississippi Code allows any person to "contest the qualifications of ... a
candidate for any office elected at a general election ... [by filing] a petition
specifically setting forth the grounds of the challenge not later than thirty-
one (31) days after the date of the first primary election .... ,,161 The statute
also provides for an expedited appeals process. 163
I61 Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-963 (West 2006). Mississippi also has a pre-primary candi-
date qualifications statute. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-961 (West zoo6). Just as the general
election challenge statute does not allow challenges up to the time of the general election,
section 23-15-961 does not allow challenges up to the time of the primary election. There is
no reason for Kentucky to adopt similar limitations on pre-primary challenges because the
risks inherent in challenges coming after the primary and before the general election are not
present in pre-primary challenges. Namely, pre-primary challenges leave no danger that the
electorate will be left without a true choice in the general election, nor do they give rise to a
risk that one of the major parties might be left without a candidate in the general election. As
a result, this Note takes the position that Kentucky should maintain the current state of its
law insofar as it allows bonafides challenges up to and through the primary election, but should
limit these post-primary challenges along the same lines that Mississippi has limited them in
section 23-15-963.
162 Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-963(1) (West 2006). Subsection (I) contemplates that such
challenges will be initially filed with and heard by an election commission. See Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 23-15-359, 23-15-963(I) (West 2OO6). KRS § 118.176 allows challenges to be filed and
heard in circuit court. As the Kentucky circuit courts appear well-equipped to handle these
types of disputes, there does not appear to be any reason why Kentucky should create elec-
tion commissions to hear these challenges like Mississippi has. After all, Mississippi allows
the decision of an election commission to be appealed to a circuit court for a de novo hearing,
so it stands to reason that if Kentucky followed Mississippi's plan, most cases would end up
receiving a de novo hearing in circuit court anyway. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-963(4), (5)
(West 2oo6). Thus, Kentucky should continue to give circuit courts original jurisdiction over
bonafides challenges.
163 Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-963(4)-(6) (West zoo6).
2oo6-2oo7]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Mississippi's approach appears to successfully balance the voters' inter-
ests in guaranteeing that only qualified candidates are on the ballot and in
having a true choice between candidates and the partisan political system's
interest in the appearance of candidates from both major parties on the bal-
lot. Given the public's wide-ranging access to information today, it seems
highly unlikely that an unqualified candidate would be able to escape de-
tection for more than thirty-one days. Thus, the thirty-one day limit seems
reasonable. Moreover, because Kentucky's primary election is held on the
first Tuesday after the third Monday in May, 64 the thirty-one day period
and the expedited appeals process would likely allow a final decision to be
rendered by the end of summer, which is the beginning of campaign sea-
son. As a result, a replacement candidate could be selected in time to run a
meaningful campaign, thus giving voters a legitimate choice and ensuring
that neither political party is foreclosed from offering a candidate in the
election.
The Mississippi approach provides a good solution to the problem of
maximizing the electorate's opportunity to challenge unqualified candi-
dates while also ensuring that voters have a true choice at the polls. It does
not, however, provide a certain solution to what is perhaps the biggest prob-
lem with the current wording of KRS § 118.176 (i.e., the potential for situ-
ations in which a bonafides challenge is filed, but not decided, prior to the
general election, thereby leading both the judiciary and legislature to claim
jurisdiction over the dispute). 65 Even though the issue was addressed in
Stephenson, that case might not prevent the issue from being raised again if a
similar situation ever were to present itself in a gubernatorial election. Be-
cause there is much more at stake in a gubernatorial election than in a state
senate election, it is conceivable that one of the parties involved would
seek to distinguish the case from Stephenson and vociferously litigate the
issue again. It is even possible that a party might simply ignore Stephenson
and pursue an appeal with the legislature."6 The manner in which the dis-
pute could arise is unimportant though. What is important is the fact that
it could happen at all and thereby pit the legislature against the judiciary
and place the commonwealth in an uncertain political position once again.
Those undesirable outcomes can be avoided, however, if KRS § 118.176 is
rewritten so as to draw a definite boundary between the judiciary's juris-
164 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1I8.025 (West 2oo6).
I65 There is no certain solution here because it would still be possible for both the leg-
islature and the judiciary to simultaneously claim authority to decide such a controversy. That
could happen, for example, if the state supreme court hears the final appeal before the general
election but fails to decide the case before the election. In that case, the legislature might
claim that a post-election decision by the court is not valid because the court's authority to
decide the case was destroyed upon the occurrence of the election by virtue of the fact that
there are no longer any "candidates" after the election.
166 See supra note 136.
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diction over pre-election challenges and the legislature's jurisdiction over
election contests.
2. Drawing a Definite Boundary between the Judiciary's Jurisdiction Over Pre-
election Bona Fides Challenges and the Legislature's Jurisdiction Over Election
Contests.-The current version of KRS § 118.176 allows bonafides chal-
lenges to be filed at any time before the general election, but it does not
require them to be adjudicated before the election. Therein lies the prob-
lem. Without a provision that terminates the court's jurisdiction prior to the
general election, there will always be a possibility, however remote, that the
judiciary and legislature will clash over simultaneous claims to jurisdiction
over the same bonafides dispute. Preventative measures should be taken to
preclude such an occurrence because, as previously mentioned, it would
be much less burdensome to rewrite the law than to suffer through another
Stephenson-like controversy.
The manner in which the state of Indiana deals with this issue is a
simple, common-sense approach that could work well for Kentucky. Sec-
tion 3-8-8-7(a) of the Indiana Code provides that at noon thirty days before
the election, regardless of the status of a bonafides challenge, the court's
jurisdiction over the dispute evaporates, the challenged candidate may not
be removed from the ballot, and any votes cast for that candidate must be
counted. 16 7 Thus, in Indiana, a bonafides challenge to a gubernatorial candi-
date would be terminated if it did not reach a final resolution within thirty
days of the general election. 68 In that event, the questions concerning that
candidate's qualifications could only be raised again in an election contest,
over which the state legislature has exclusive jurisdiction under the Indiana
Constitution,169 just like the Kentucky Constitution. 170 Indiana's law erects
a clear boundary between the jurisdiction of the courts and the legislature.
A clear boundary in that regard is exactly what Kentucky needs. If the
commonwealth were to adopt a similar provision terminating the courts'
jurisdiction at some point prior to the general election, there is no way
that both the courts and legislature could ever again simultaneously claim
jurisdiction over a candidate qualifications dispute. In addition, adopting
that kind of provision would also promote the interests of giving voters a
legitimate choice between two candidates and of giving both major parties
meaningful candidates in elections by preventing candidates from being
disqualified so close to the general election that a replacement cannot be
selected in time to make a difference.
167 IND. CODE ANN. § 3-8-8-7(a) (West 2oo6).
168 Id.
169 IND. CONST. art. 5, § 6.




In light of the current state of Kentucky election law and the recent dis-
putes revolvifg around Hunter Bates and Dana Seum Stephenson, it seems
likely that Kentucky has not seen the end of controversies involving candi-
date qualifications. A particularly undesirable type of dispute that looms on
the horizon is one in which the residency qualifications of a gubernatorial
slate are challenged on election eve, thereby putting the legislature and ju-
diciary in conflict once again and potentially leaving the commonwealth for
an extended period of time without any official who has a clear mandate to
govern the state. To prevent this situation from occurring, Kentucky courts
should clarify and reform the state's definition of residency by adopting a
pure domicile test, and the legislature should rewrite KRS § 118.176.
A pure domicile approach to residency is appropriate for a number of
reasons. The history of section 90 of the Kentucky Constitution, the in-
terpretation of similar provisions in the state constitution, and the experi-
ences of other states all counsel in favor of that approach. It is also apt from
a policy standpoint because we live in a "flat world" with an increasingly
transitory society. In our contemporary society, people often move from one
place to another in order to gain experience and expertise, but they often
do not abandon their home state during their absence. That reality should
be recognized, and as a matter of policy, we should encourage Kentuckians
who seek opportunities outside the state to return and share their expertise
with the people of the commonwealth. It is time for Kentucky to adopt a
commonsense definition of residency that is both consistent with the past
and with the realities of the future.
In rewriting KRS § 118.176, the general assembly should seek to pre-
vent clashes between the courts and legislature while at the same time bal-
ancing the electorate's interest in challenging unqualified candidates with
the electorate's other interest in having a true choice between candidates
and the interest of our two-party political system in ensuring that one of
the major parties is not left out of an election. To achieve those objectives,
Kentucky should adopt a hybrid of the approaches used by Mississippi and
Indiana. Such an approach would scale back the period of time in which
a candidate's qualifications can be challenged before the general election
and set a clear pre-election line at which the courts' jurisdiction over bona
fides challenges evaporates. Establishing a definite boundary between the
courts' and the legislature's jurisdictions is the only way to absolutely pre-
vent another clash between those two branches of government over the
authority to decide disputes concerning candidates' qualifications.
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